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OSH ACT HAZARD COMMUNICATION
STANDARD PREEMPTION OF STATE RIGHT
TO KNOW LAWS UNDER NEW JERSEY
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V.
HUGHEY, 868 F.2D 621 (3d CIR. 1989)
Under the Supremacy Clause,' a state law that conflicts with a fed-
eral statute or regulation is void.2 With the expansion of the federal
bureaucracy,3 courts are adjudicating increasing numbers4 of disputes
between federal and state agencies which regulate similar areas of law.
Preemption disputes frequently arise in the area of labor law, where
federal agencies have largely supplanted the states' traditional regula-
tory function.5 Cases involving the federal Occupational Safety and
1. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 11.
2. The Supreme Court considers federal agency rules to have "no less preemptive
effect than federal statutes." Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
3. Addressing Congress in 1976, President Ford stated:
Federal programs and bureaucracies have grown geometrically. In the last fifteen
years 236 departments, agencies, bureaus and commissions have been created while
only 21 have been eliminated. Today we have more than a thousand different Fed-
eral programs [and] more than 80 regulatory agencies [whose] primary purpose is
to regulate some aspect of our lives.
H.R. Doc. No. 495, 94th Cong., 122 CONG. REc. 13784 (daily ed. May 13, 1976) (state-
ment of Pres. Ford).
4. There are two kinds of preemption. First, preemption is express when an agency
occupies an entire field or states its intention to preempt a specific class of laws. Second,
implied preemption occurs when compliance with both laws is impossible or when the
effect of a state law is adverse to the purposes of federal law. See, eg., Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (state law is preempted to the extent state
and federal laws conflict even if federal law does not occupy the field); Fidelity Federal,
458 U.S. at 153 (preemption is a question of congressional intent); Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 725, 751 (1981) (subject matter of dispute preempted by a federal statute).
5. Preemption case law has arisen with respect to the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982), the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 US.C. §§ 651-
78 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1982), the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982) and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461 (1988).
Washington University Open Scholarship
244 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:243
Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act)6 provide a good example of the com-
plexities presented by labor law preemption.7 Even within narrowly
defined areas of law, courts approach these issues inconsistently, prof-
fering multiple and sometimes contradictory standards and methodolo-
gies to resolve alleged conflicts in the law.8 In New Jersey Chamber of
Commerce v. Hughey,9 the Third Circuit held that the OSH Act
preempts part of the New Jersey Worker and Community Right to
Know Act (Right to Know Act)"0 requiring disclosure of hazardous
substances in the work place. This holding established a new, two-step
method of preemption analysis in OSH Act cases.
In Hughey," representatives of the chemical and fragrance indus-
tries brought suit in federal district court against various New Jersey
officials 2 seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to prevent
enforcement of the Right to Know Act. 13 The plaintiffs argued that
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. According to one writer on OSH Act cases, "the issue of federal preemption has
seldom been one with bright lines and clear legal precedent." Tyson, The Preemptive
Effect of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard on State and Community Right to
Know Laws, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1010, 1023 (1987). Tyson concludes, the out-
comes "often [turn] more upon the facts of the case and the philosophy of the court
than upon the application of precise legal principles." Id.
8. The courts have established an array of standards in preemption disputes involv-
ing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Compare United Steel Workers v.
Meierhenry, 608 F. §.pp. 201, 205 (D.S.D. 1985) (holding that when state law conflicts
with NLRA, "importance of state law is of no materiality") with Vane v. Nocella, 303
Md. 362, 494 A.2d.181 (1985) (balancing state and federal interests).
9. 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1989).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to 5A-31 (West 1984). See infra note 13 (describ-
ing contents). The Governor of New Jersey signed into law the New Jersey Worker and
Community Right to Know Act in August of 1983. At that time, many other states had
enacted or were considering similar legislation to remedy what one House report called
OSHA's "miserly use of its delegated powers to deal with disease and death-dealing
toxic substances." House Comm. on Government Operations, Failure to Meet Com-
mitments Made in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, H.R. REP. No. 710, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977).
11. 600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1985).
12. Id. at 609. Theseofficials included the Commissioner of Environmental Protec-
tion, the Commissioner of Health, and the Acting Commissioner of Labor. In addition,
the court allowed twenty-nine labor unions, environmental groups and citizens' groups
to intervene on New Jersey's behalf. Id.
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.5A-1 to 5A-31. The Right to Know Act requires that
New Jersey employers prepare and submit to the State Department of Health and local
fire and police departments environmental and workplace surveys listing all hazardous
substanges in the plant. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-7 (West 1984). The public may view
these surveys upon request. § 34:5A-9. Employers additionally must ensure that all
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the OSH Act's Hazard Communication Standard 14 expressly pre-
empted 5 the Right to Know Act. 1 6 The defendants countered that the
OSH Act is limited to employee health and safety issues,1 7 whereas the
Right to Know Act addresses broader concerns of community health
and safety and is therefore exempt from preemption.' 8 The District
Court for the District of New Jersey granted plaintiffs' motion for par-
tial summary judgment, holding that the OSH Act's preemption lan-
containers and chemical pipelines are properly labeled. § 34:5A-14. Whereas § 14(a)
requires labeling of "environmental hazardous substances" and "workplace hazardous
substances" by chemical name, § 14(b) requires labeling of all chemical containers, haz-
ardous or otherwise, by listing the five most prevalent substances. The Act provides for
exceptions to the labeling rules to protect trade secrets. Id. Finally, the Right to Know
Act requires employers to warn employees of potential health risks and teach them how
to properly handle hazardous substances. § 34:5A-13.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). The Hazard Communication Standard requires
employers to (1) label containers, but not pipelines, containing hazardous substances,
(2) train and educate workers regarding hazardous substances, and (3) issue a Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for each hazardous substance in the workplace. Originally
limited to employers in the manufacturing sector, the Standard was later extended to all
of industry. 868 F.2d at 625.
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). The 1987 changes included the spelling out
of procedures employers must follow in disclosing hazards, as well as reworded preemp-
tion language. One author feels that these changes broaden the Standard's preemptive
scope, in addition to extending its coverage. Noting that the list of procedures includes
some required of employers under New Jersey law, the commentator concludes that
OSHA intended to overrule the recently-decided Hughey II. Note, The Preemptive Ef-
fect of the Emergency Planning And Community Right-to-Know Act and OSHA's Haz-
ard Communication Standard, 67 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1153, 1174-76 (1989). This may read
too much into the articulation of what is already known (i.e. what constitutes hazard
communication); the only substantive change concerned new industries subject to the
standard. The author also fails to appreciate the agency's conscious retention of its
prior preemption language, albeit in different form. Compare 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(a)(2) ("no state or political subdivision of a state may adopt ... any re-
quirement relating to the issue addressed by this Federal standard") with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(a)(2) (1984) ("[t]his standard is intended . . . to preempt any state law
pertaining to this subject."). See New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey
(Hughey H1), 868 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1989) (reading this change to show OSHA's
intent to make clear that the standard applies to local units of government).
16. 600 F. Supp. at 616-17. Plaintiffs maintained further that the Right to Know
Act's disclosure provisions constitute a deprivation of trade secrets without due process.
Citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 476 U.S. 986 (1984), the court held this claim to be
without merit. 600 F. Supp. at 622-28. The Third Circuit subsequently agreed. 774
F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1985).
17. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (reviewing the OSH Act's history and
purpose).
18. 600 F. Supp. at 618.
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guage"9  and the Hazard Communication Standard expressly
preempted2" the Right to Know Act 21 in its entirety. 22 On appeal
(Hughey 1), the Third Circuit reversed in part,23 affirmed in part 24 and
remanded the case to the district court for further findings.25
On remand,26 the district court considered whether New Jersey's la-
beling requirements "in fact" contravened the OSH Act's purpose by
presenting an increased risk of harm.27 The court found the threat
19. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing OSH Act's preemptive
language).
20. 600 F.2d at 618. Because Congress included language of preemption in the
Standard itself, "the question is one of statutory interpretation, not implied preemp-
tion." Id The district court here mistakenly read express and implied preemption to be
mutually exclusive analyses. See, eg., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)
(applying express and implied preemption analysis); see infra notes 42-49 and accompa-
nying text (applying both express and implied analyses).
21. As further support for its holding, Hughey I noted that New Jersey chose not to
seek approval for its regulatory scheme pursuant to § 18(b) of the OSH Act. 600 F.2d
at 618. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (allowing any state to submit a plan to take over devel-
opment and enforcement of workplace health and safety standards "relating to" an ex-
isting OSHA standard). The Third Circuit repeated this theme in Hughey I, stating,
"the role of the states is circumscribed by § 18(b)." United Steelworkers of America v.
Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 733 (3d Cir. 1985). Cf infra note 22 (questioning this
reasoning).
22. The court used architectural and botanical allusions to show that the Right to
Know Act is inseparable, describing its otherwise acceptable, "non-workplace regula-
tory plan" as "superimposed upon a regulatory foundation" covered by the OSHA stan-
dard, and finding the plans "inextricably intertwined." 600 F. Supp. at 622. Hughey
Ps presumption of inseparability is nowhere explained, but the court apparently feared
that states were appending trivial, non-workplace rules to their right-to-know laws in
order to defeat "unwanted federal legislation." Id at 619 (quoting Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 651-2 (1971)).
23. 774 F.2d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1985). The court held the Hazard Communica-
tion Standard expressly preempted those sections on chemical surveys and container
labeling whose "primary purpose" was employee protection from workplace hazards.
Id.
24. Id Hughey I let other survey and labeling sections stand, to the extent that they
addressed environmental and community protection in addition to occupational safety.
Id. at 596. The court further found the various sections of the Act to be severable under
New Jersey law. Id
25. The court remanded to resolve the issue of implied preemption, not reached in
Hughey I Id. See supra note 4 (explaining implied preemption).
26. See New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, Nos. 88-5283, 88-5332
(D.N.J. Feb. 5, 1988).
27. Hughey II, 868 F.2d at 628. The court weighed conflicting expert testimony on
the likelihood that a dual federal and state labeling system would confuse, and hence
endanger workers handling chemicals. Id. at 629-30.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/10
NEW JERSEY V. HUGHEY
minimal, and therefore the Standard did not impliedly preempt the
Right to Know Act.2 8 On appeal (Hughey I),29 the Third Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's implied preemption holding,3 0 and ruled that
the first appeal foreclosed rehearing on the issue of express
31preemption.
Congress enacted the OSH Act to combat an alarming incidence of
job-related injuries to workers.3 2 To this end, Congress vested the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with broad
powers to regulate work-place conditions.3 3 Section 18 of the OSH
Act preempts state law by allowing state courts or agencies jurisdiction
over "any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
standard is in effect.",3 4 Each standard, then, defines its own scope of
28. Id. at 630. The court ruled that thorough safety training, required by the OSH
Act, would minimize the risk of workers' confusion. Id
29. 868 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1989).
30. Id. at 631. In accepting the lower court's factual findings, the Third Circuit
applied a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id. at 629. The court also disagreed
with the plaintiffs' legal argument that modifications to OSHA's labeling and training
programs, needed under a dual labeling system, created an "impermissible intrusion"
into the federal program. Id. at 630. The court noted that OSHA framed its standards
in flexible terms. Id. Lastly, the court rejected the argument that states may not take
actions OSHA declined to take, restating Hughey I's holding that Congress did not
intend for OSHA to occupy the field of occupational safety. Id. See infra notes 39-40
(discussing intended role for states in occupational safety).
31. Id. at 626-28. In Justice Becker's view, Hughey I "evince[d] a clear holding,"
despite its failure to specify the preempted sections of the New Jersey Act. Id. at 627.
He next proceeded to interpret the opinion's admittedly "somewhat opaque" language,
creating (in part) his own "binding precedent." Id. Judge Becker held that the prior
decision struck down § 14(a) as it applied to substances that are hazardous in the work-
place but are environmentally safe. However, other hazardous substances were subject
to the labeling requirement. Id. at 6.28. The Standard preempted none of § 14(b), re-
quiring the labeling of all substance containers by chemical composition. Id. at 627-28.
32. According to its statement of purpose, the OSH Act seeks to "assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions." 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congressional hearings at the time
revealed that on-the-job accidents were killing 14,500 and disabling 2.2 million workers
per year. Moreover, the Public Health Service estimated that industry introduced a
new, potentially toxic chemical into the workplace every twenty minutes. S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1970).
33. The Secretary of Labor may promulgate standards "reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment." 29
U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In one court's words, Congress gave
OSHA "almost unlimited discretion to devise means to achieve the congressionally
mandated goal." United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647
F.2d 1189, 1230 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1980).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). A state wishing to avoid preemption may submit a plan to
1990]
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preemption.3 5  The Hazard Communication Standard,3 6 however,
more explicitly states its intent to preempt "any legal requirements of a
state, or political subdivision of a state, pertaining to the subject."37
Predictably, the courts have easily struck down state regulatory
schemes that regulate hazard communication for the benefit of work-
ers. 38 Nevertheless, the OSH Act contemplates and even encourages
states to regulate workplace safety in certain instances. 39 Responsibil-
ity for occupational safety regulation is clearly shared between state
and federal agencies.' The difficult question arises where a state regu-
OSHA to regulate any area with respect to which an OSHA standard is in place. 29
U.S.C. § 667(b),(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986). As an incentive, the agency will pay for up to
ninety percent of the cost of developing the plan, and up to half the enforcement costs.
29 U.S.C. § 672(f),(g) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Some courts have read these sections to
preempt state law, concluding that state regulations touching on workplace safety issues
are void because the state chose not to submit a plan. See supra note 21 (discussing this
analysis). Such reasoning is defective because it creates a presumption that the state
intended to regulate aspects of occupational safety "relating to" an OSHA standard.
35. The OSH Act complicates the determination of preemptive scope, though, by
failing to define an "issue" under § 18. See Note, The Preemptive Effect of OSHA's
Hazard Communication Standard Outside the Manufacturing Sector, 85 B.Y.U. L. REv.
815, 817 (1985).
36. See supra note 14 (describing the Standard). The Hazard Communication Stan-
dard was promulgated pursuant to § 655(b)(7) of the OSH Act, authorizing the Secre-
tary of Labor to develop standards "prescrib[ing] the use of labels or other appropriate
forms of warning" to protect employees from occupational hazards. 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1988). The Standard also repeats OSH Act's pre-
emption language in the affirmative, stating that § 18 prohibits a state from "adopt[ing]
or enforc[ing], through any court or agency, any requirement relating to the issue ad-
dressed by this standard, except pursuant to a federally-approved state plan." Id
Nearly identical language appears in OSHA Instruction STP 2-1.113, Office of State
Programs, D(4) (April 9, 1984).
38. See, eg., Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 44 (1987); United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 763
F.2d 728, 735 (3d Cir. 1985). See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing
Auchter); infra note 99 (discussing Akron).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (encouraging "the States to assume the fullest re-
sponsibility for the administration and enforcement of their occupational safety and
health laws"); § 667(a) (preserving the right of states to regulate in areas not covered
by an OSHA standard); § 653(b)(4) (preserving state common law and statutory rights
of action for injured workers); § 672 (providing grants to states to formulate and ad-
minister plans).
40. See, eg., American Federation of Labor v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (the OSH Act creates a "dynamic federal-state partnership in occupational
health and safety matters"); Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 145 N.J.
Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408,410 (1976) ("OSHA in no way preempted the field of occupa-
tional safety").
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lates hazard communication to ends other than, or in addition to,
worker safety.41
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Hazard
Communication Standard preempts state law,42 several decisions ad-
dress federal law pre-emption under similar circumstances. In Jones v.
Rath Packing Co.,43 the Court compared federal' and state rules"
governing weight labeling of flour packages.' The Court applied an
express preemption analysis and upheld the California requirement
under the federal rule's preemption language.47 The Court, however,
found the practical effect of the state rule inimical to the congressional
goal of preventing consumer confusion.4" The state rule was therefore
impliedly preempted, though the Court failed to describe the facts that
supported this finding.49
41. See infra notes 71-74, 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing cases on state
regulatory efforts beyond worker safety).
42. The Court has entertained challenges to particular OSH Act regulations and
standards. See, e-g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) (upholding regula-
tion protecting employees from employer discrimination for refusal to do a task em-
ployee reasonably believes to be dangerous); American Textile Mfrs. Institute v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding standard limiting occupational exposure to
cotton dust).
43. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1988) (Fair Packaging'and Labeling Act); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-92 (1988) (Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12211 (West Supp. 1977).
46. The Court also passed on labeling rules affecting wholesale meat packers, hold-
ing that because the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95 (1988), specifi-
cally allows for reasonable loss of weight in distribution and the California law does not,
the latter is expressly preempted. 430 U.S. at 529, 532.
47. 430 U.S. at 538. The FDCA "supersedes" state requirements which are "less
stringent than or require information different from" their Federal counterparts. 15
U.S.C. § 1461. Because it does not allow for weight loss due to loss of moisture, the
California act is more stringent than the Federal rule. 430 U.S. at 541.
48. 430 U.S. at 534. The purpose of the FDCA was to "facilitate value comparisons
among similar products." 15 U.S.C. § 1461. The Court reasoned that California pack-
ers distributing within and outside of the state would overpack containers to compen-
sate for weight loss in shipment, whereas California packers who exported their entire
product would not. As a result, some consumers of California flour in other states
would be precluded from making accurate weight comparisons. 430 U.S. at 544.
49. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, objected to the means by which the Court con-
cluded that the California rule would cause overpacking and consumer confusion.
Rehnquist charged that the majority's reasoning rested on "unwarranted speculations
that hardly rise to that clear demonstration of conflict that must exist before the mere
existence of a federal law may be said to preempt state law operating in the same field."
Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Using a similar two-step analysis in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n.,50 the Court upheld a
state law arguably touching on safety aspects of nuclear power genera-
tion, a field entirely preempted by federal agency law.51 The disputed
California provisions" required utilities to demonstrate adequate stor-
age capacity for nuclear waste before the state licensed any new reac-
tor.53 Against industry allegations of unlawful intent, the Court
accepted California's position that these safeguards served economic,
rather than safety, purposes.54 By citing the legislature's published
statement of intention, the majority avoided a search for "true mo-
tives."55 Considering whether the state law was impliedly preempted,
the Court held that the California law would not frustrate the Atomic
Energy Act's goal of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.56
In Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,57 the Court relied solely on implied pre-
50. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
51. Id. at 209. The Atomic Energy Act provides that state or local agencies may
regulate nuclear powerplants "for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards." 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982). The Court read this to give the Federal Govern-
ment "complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy generation." 461
U.S. at 211.
52. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
53. California utility companies argued that sections of the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2021(k), expressly preempted the state law, because the latter regulated
plant construction and evinced a safety purpose. 461 U.S. at 204. In the Court's view,
the case raised the "difficult proposition" of how the California law was to be "con-
strued and classified." Id at 212.
54. Id. at 216. The states may decide what their generating requirements are and
how to fulfill them, but they may not impose a moratorium on nuclear power plant
construction based on safety concerns. Id In this instance, the Court accepted the
state's argument that its law was economic in nature, as demonstrated by a legislative
committee document stating that the waste disposal problem is one of costs and not
safety. Id at 216.
55. 461 U.S. at 216. Conceding that the factors surrounding the legislature's deci-
sion to enact the waste law are "subject to varying interpretation," the Court refused to
divine California's true reason, declaring that "inquiry into legislative motive is often an
unsatisfactory venture." Id There are, however, limits to accepting official legislative
statements of purpose. See, eg., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (question-
ing state's purported conservation motive in a law banning the export of natural min-
nows while not limiting the number sold instate); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971) (rejecting state's safety motive for a law revoking the driver's license of judgment
debtors from traffic accidents who subsequently declare bankruptcy).
56. Id. at 222. Congress disfavored nuclear electrification "at all costs," authorizing
states "to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for
economic reasons." Id at 223.
57. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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emption to resolve a conflict between a Wisconsin tort claim58 and sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.59 The Court
considered Congress' wish to create a unified labor relations system
with sole jurisdiction over labor contract disputes.' Finding that the
claim did not involve a "nonnegotiable state-law right," the Court held
that a tort action "derive[d] from" a contract obtained through a col-
lective bargaining agreement is impliedly preempted.61
With Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc.,62 the
Supreme Court recently resolved a preemption dispute, arising under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), that
involved preemption language similar to that found in the OSH Act.6"
In Mackey, a collection agency sought to garnish funds of a vacation
plan subject to ERISA for debts incurred by certain plan partici-
pants." Writing for the majority, Justice White affirmed the Georgia
Supreme Court's ruling that ERISA preempted a Georgia garnishment
58. The plaintiff, an employee, alleged that his employer handled his disability in-
surance claim in bad faith, a tort under Wisconsin law. Ia at 207. The insurance
policy in question was the fruit of a LMRA-collective-bargaining agreement. Id at 205.
59. 471 U.S. at 210. Because the LMRA allows, but does not explicitly require,
plaintiffs to sue in federal court on breach of collective bargaining agreements, the
Court found it necessary to determine whether Congress intended federal courts to hear
all such contractual disputes under federal law, over and above state law interpreta-
tions. Id at 209. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
60. 471 U.S. at 212. In the interests of "interpretive uniformity and predictability,"
the Court stated that federal common law must govern in disputes requiring the inter-
pretation of labor contracts. Id The Court concluded that preemption was called for
in the present case because "only that result preserves the central role of arbitration in
our 'system of industrial self-government.'" Id at 219. By comparison, the OSH Act
posits uniformity as a desirable, but secondary, goal to that of ensuring worker health
and safety. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (safety over uniformity in the
Third Circuit).
61. 471 U.S. at 214, 220. The holding excluded suits "tangentially involving a pro-
vision of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 212. In so ruling, the Court em-
ployed a standard preempting any state law claim whose resolution is "substantially
dependent" on an analysis of contractual terms. Id. at 221.
62. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
63. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides as follows:
... the provisions of [ERISA] shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan...
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis supplied). Cf OSH Act section on preemption, supra
note 34 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of ERISA preemption, see
Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 Tax. L. Rnv. 1313 (1984).
64. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184.
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statute65 that specifically barred garnishment of funds in an ERISA
benefit plan.66 With respect to Georgia's garnishment statute of gen-
eral application,67 however, the Court found that Congressional intent
and the plain language of ERISA indicated that the vacation funds
would be amenable to garnishment in connection with a state court
judgement.6" Preemption, therefore, depended on a simple semantic
difference between the various state statutes.6 9
State and federal courts initially interpreted the OSH Act as broadly
preempting state regulatory efforts.7" In Five Migrant Workers v. Hoff-
man 71 migrant farm workers sought to compel New Jersey to enforce a
state law providing for preoccupancy inspections of migrant labor
camps.72 Prior to this action, the state legislature had elected to dis-
continue its plan, with the view that OSHA inspection standards obvi-
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 184-22.1 (1982).
66. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2185. The Court relied on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 96-97, (1983) and its progeny, which read ERISA's "relating to" language
as synonymous with making "reference to." Id In Mackey, Georgia's statute directly
and unambiguously stated its application to ERISA plans. The Court also noted that
legislative "good intentions" could not diminish the broad preemptive scope of § 514(a).
Id.
67. GA. CODE ANN. § 184-20 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1987).
68. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191. Unlike the preempted statute, Georgia's general
statute "does not single out or specifically mention ERISA plans of any kind." Id. at
2186. Equally significant to the Court, ERISA expressly provided in § 206(d)(1) that
"pension" benefits could never be garnished under state law. By contrast, Congress said
nothing about garnishing "welfare" benefits of the type involved in Mackey. Id. at
2188-89.
69. The overinclusive statute survived as applied to § 514(a) of ERISA, while the
narrow statute fell. The Court's actions in the second part of the opinion seem to un-
dercut its depiction of ERISA's "broad preemptive scope" in the first part. Id. at 2185.
Mackey's significance may rest in the Court's literalistic reading of "relating to," as
requiring direct reference to the federal law in the body of the statute being examined.
70. See, ag., Stanislawski v Industrial Comm'n., 99 Ill. 2d 36, 457 N.E.2d 399
(1983). In Stanislawski, the court dismissed a survivor's action for damages under Ill-
nois statutes adopting OSHA standards as that state's own and creating rights of action
for injured employees against employers who violated Illinois' standards. The court
held that state rules merely duplicating Federal standards are preempted unless the
state submits to OSHA a plan which is subsequently approved. Id. at 40,457 N.E.2d at
401. Although technically correct in holding that no action may proceed under a void
law, the court failed to consider that the OSH Act leaves unaffected any state remedies
for violation of an occupational law that the OSH Act included. But cf Berardi, infra
notes 76-81 (upholding a similar law making building owners liable to construction
workers for injuries resulting from safety violations).
71. 136 N.J. Super. 242, 345 A.2d 378 (1975).
72. Id. at 245, 345 A.2d at 380. From 1972 through 1975 the New Jersey Depart-
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ated state regulation.73 The state district court dismissed the case,
finding the OSH Act was "so broad and sweeping as to encompass the
entire gamut of migrant worker protection in the field of inspection [of]
housing quarters."'74
By the early 1980s, some courts began to set limits on OSH Act
preemption.75 In Berardi v. Getty Refining and Marketing Co.,76 a
construction worker sued a building owner for personal injuries7 7
under a New York law requiring owners to provide safety equipment at
construction sites.78 Noting that the OSH Act's scope of preemption
of state "related" law had yet to be "clearly delineated," the court re-
fused to extend the OSH Act to owners and contractors despite their
functional similarity to employers in the construction context.79 The
court reasoned that because the OSH Act preserves state common law
remedies80 and the New York law is remedial in nature, the state law
was not preempted. Finally, the court justified its result by noting that
the state law complements the OSH Act's policy of promoting safe
ment of Labor inspected camps both before and after occupancy under an OSHA-ap-
proved plan.
73. Id The New Jersey Department of Labor defended its inaction by indicating
that the federal program preempted its plan. Id
74. Id at 246, 345 A.2d at 381. The court found that the state and federal stan-
dards were "substantially similar," despite the fact that the latter only provided for
post-occupancy camp inspection. Id at 245, 345 A.2d at 380. This comparison was
inessential to the outcome, however, as the court based its holding primarily on its
reading of the OSH Act. Indeed, the court opined that preemption cannot "turn upon a
comparison of the respective regulations." Id at 247, 345 A.2d at 381.
75. See, eg., Harrington v. Dept. of Labor and Industry, 163 N.J.Super. 595, 395
A.2d 533 (1978) (upholding toilet and drinking water regulations for migrants under a
New Jersey law related to those rejected in Hoffman). In dictum, Harrington narrowed
the preemptive scope of OSHA's migrant housing standard, stating that the "situation"
was such that "state regulation in the same field would [not] be impermissible interfer-
ence." Id. at 536.
76. 107 Misc.2d 451, 435 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1980).
77. The plaintiff fell while repairing the defendant's water tower, sustaining serious
injuries. Id at 452, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
78. The New York law imposed a duty on owners, contractors and their agents, in
construction, demolition or repairs to provide workers safety devices or adequate pro-
tection. Breach of this duty rendered culpable parties liable for civil damages. N.Y.
LAB. LAW §§ 240, 241 subd. 6 (McKinney 1986).
79. Id. at 453, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15. Neither owners nor contractors are men-
tioned anywhere in the OSH Act. Ironically, the employer in Berardi was held ninety-
five percent liable under common law contribution for its role in the accident. Id. at
461, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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working conditions."1
Two years after Berardi, but before OSHA issued its Hazard Com-
munication Standard, a federal court upheld a West Virginia right-to-
know act 2 against an industry challenge. In West Virginia Mfrs Assn.
v. State of West Virginia 3 the plaintiffs argued that either a "related"
standard already existed, or that OSHA's choice not to issue a notice
and posting standard indicated that the agency found none necessary. 84
Limiting its analysis to express preemption, the court found that the
allegedly related standard regulated the "level of exposure" rather than
hazard communication,8 5 and that an absence of standards alone has
no preemptive force.8 6
A federal court addressed the Hazard Communication Standard for
the first time in United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter,87 an action
brought by labor representatives.88 As in West Virginia, the Third Cir-
cuit in Auchter confined its discussion to express preemption 9 and held
that the standard "applies to the exclusion of state disclosure laws
which have not been approved" pursuant to section 18(b).' Neverthe-
81. 107 Misc.2d at 461, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 219. A state law that supports a federal
policy goal is not an independent justification for its constitutionality, but rather a de-
fense to an implied preemption challenge. The court may have used this policy argu-
ment as a "tie-breaker" in a close case of express preemption.
82. W. VA. CODE § 21-3-18 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
83. 542 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.W.V. 1982).
84. Id at 1253-54.
85. Id. at 1254.
86. Id
87. 763 F.2d. 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
88. The Steelworkers, with eight states that intervened or filed amicus curiae, chal-
lenged the new standard and sought a ruling as to its preemptive effect on state safety
regulations. In the plaintiffs' iew, OSHA wrongly limited the standard to the manu-
facturing field, failed to adopt a certain list of hazardous chemicals compiled by the
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) and included an overly
broad trade secret exemption. Id at 736. The court upheld the standard but ruled that
the issue of its application beyond the manufacturing sector was ripe for review. Id. at
738-39. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Secretary of Labor's
choice not to use the NIOSH list, but struck down the trade secret provision as over-
broad. Id. at 739-42.
89. By not conducting an implied preemption analysis, the court seems to have lim-
ited its holding to state rules substantially similar to the Hazard Communication
Standard.
90. 763 F.2d at 735. The court observed that intervenor states had not, and proba-
bly would not, seek OSHA approval in the future for their plans, as "section 18 contem-
plates that if they do so, they take on the fiscal burdens of enforcement now borne by
the United States." Id at 734. This ignores the reason the states went to court in the
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less, Auchter raised, in dictum, policy questions central to implied pre-
emption analysis. The court suggested that the Secretary of Labor's
wish to limit the burden of multiple state laws on industry might con-
flict with the OSH Act's paramount safety principle.9 1 According to
the Third Circuit, Congress meant to elevate worker safety over strictly
commercial considerations.9 2
Soon after Hughey I, a federal district court upheld most of the
Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act93 in Mfrs.
Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper.9 ' In Knepper, labeling requirements
for chemical suppliers withstood an express preemption, challenge be-
cause the court did not consider the "primary purpose" of the labeling
requirements to be identification of hazards to employees. 95 In its
analysis for implied preemption the court simply noted that because
the plaintiffs did not allege that dual labeling systems would confuse
workers the law was not impliedly preempted.9 6 The federal standard,
first place, which was to challenge the federal standard. Also, the court's assessment of
the economic distribution is not entirely accurate because the OSH Act provides state
grants of up to half the cost of enforcing approved regulations. See supra note 34 (ex-
plaining state grant provision).
91. Id. at 734. In the court's view, such a result would be "arguably at odds with
[the] congressional intention that the OSH Act provide a federal floor for safety in the
workplace." Id.
92. lId The burden of state laws on industry "does not appear to have been a signif-
icant congressional concern." Rather, "Congress favored a uniform federal law so that
those states providing vigorous protection would not be disadvantaged by those that did
not." Id This reading of legislative history comports with the Supreme Court's finding
that the OSH Act's "fundamental objective [is] to prevent occupational deaths and seri-
ous injuries," to which end regulations are "to be liberally construed to effectuate the
[aforementioned] congressional purpose." Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12-
14 (1980).
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon Supp. 1989). The court found
Pennsylvania's hazard disclosure law to be "substantially similar although not identi-
cal" to its New Jersey counterpart. Mfrs. Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d
130, 134 (3d Cir. 1986).
94. 623 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 801
F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987).
95. Id at 139. The court observed that the rule "addresses broader concerns than
workplace safety" because labeling by suppliers "will facilitate employer compliance"
with sections of the act addressed to environmental and community health concerns.
Id.
96. Id at 139-40. The court in Hughey remanded at this point for a factual deter-
mination on the standards' compatibility. 774 F.2d at 596. Knepper took a hands-off
approach, and seemed to modify the Hughey test by ruling that the court need not
undertake implied preemption analyses where the plaintiff fails to plead that the stated
standard will impair a federal goal. 801 F.2d at 139-40.
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however, expressly preempted, the state requirements insofar as they
required employers to label containers, because exemptions for employ-
ers without employees indicated an overt safety purpose.9 7 The court
applied Hughey's two-part test to other portions of the law, achieving
similar results.98
The implied preemption analysis alluded to in Auchter, along with a
new express preemption standard, arrived with the first appellate deci-
sion in Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey.99 With Hughey, the Third
Circuit applied this analysis to resolve whether the State of New Jersey
impermissibly regulated hazard communication to workers or properly
regulated environmental, health and welfare issues under its police
power. The Hughey court looked beyond definitions,"°° scrutinizing
the state's Right to Know Act to distinguish repugnant from accept-
able portions. Legislative intent"0 was the basis for Hughey's express
preemption analysis, establishing a "primary purpose" test." 2 The
court held that New Jersey's "workplace hazardous substance" rules
could be separated into permissible parts, enacted to protect workers
and nonworkers alike, and impermissible parts, addressed to workers
97. Id at 140.
98. 801 F.2d at 136, 141. The court upheld rules requiring suppliers to disseminate
material safety data sheets and to undertake hazardous substance surveys. Id. Respect-
ing the latter rule, the court found relevant to its express preemption analysis New
Jersey's separate workplace hazard and environmental hazard survey rules, as opposed
to Pennsylvania's single survey requirement. Id. See infra note 110 and accompanying
text (discussing this discrepancy). The court also rejected rules providing for hazard
education and posting of hazardous substance surveys. Id at 138, 142.
99. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing of Hughey I's two-
part test). The Sixth Circuit followed Hughey I's general approach in Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n
v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986), but with important qualifications. City
of Akron cited Hughey I for the proposition that state right-to-know statutes are pre-
empted in the manufacturing field. Id at 828. In contrast to Hughey I, the court lim-
ited its discussion to express preemption for rules touching on occupational safety, and
declined to engage in a "primary purpose" analysis, giving preemptive effect to the sec-
ondary congressional goal of uniformity in the law. The court indicated that "OSHA
could legitimately determine that uniformity would aid in [compliance] with [its] stan-
dard." Id at 834.
100. The OSH Act's problematic, undefined terms include "relating to," "pertain-
ing to" and "issue." See supra notes 21, 35, 37 and accompanying text (citing and
discussing terms).
101. The inquiry into motive will vary according to the degree of deference a court
shows toward legislative determinations. See supra note 55 discussing differing ap-
proaches to this question.
102. 774 F.2d at 595. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing
"primary purpose" inquiry).
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alone." 3 Under this test, "environmental hazardous substance" rules
were facially neutral and survived scrutiny." The court next applied
the implied preemption analysis to acceptable sections, remanding to
determine whether their practical effect inhibited the OSH Act's pri-
mary goal of fostering occupational safety.10 5 On remand, the district
court concluded that these portions would not confuse or endanger
employees.
The Hughey court resolved a difficult preemption problem, namely
over-lapping regulations with allegedly differing purposes, in a manner
consistent with the policy and analysis of recent Supreme Court rul-
ings. In view of Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,1°6 the court correctly deferred to New
Jersey's determination of purpose for its express preemption analysis.
Hughey also followed longstanding doctrine, restated in Allis-Chalmers
v. Lueck, 10 7 that congressional intent defines the scope of implied pre-
emption involving federal law. 0 8 Lastly, Hughey's two-step test
closely resembles the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Jones v.
Rath Packing Co."0
Hughey requires federal courts in the Third Circuit to study both
express and implied preemption in disputes involving the Hazard Com-
munication Standard. Hughey's "primary purpose" inquiry is subject
to the charge that states may avoid preemption through fortuitous
draftsmanship, as seen in Knepper.110 The two-step test remedies this
103. Id at 596.
104. Id at 593.
105. Id. at 596.
106. 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing
Pacific Gas).
107. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing
Lueck).
108. See supra notes 4, 92 and accompanying text (discussing deference to Con-
gress). Courts may reach opposite results, particularly given that legislation may have
more than one purpose. The court may try to reconcile competing goals, as in City of
Akron, 801 F.2d 824, or focus on the predominant one, as in Hughey. See supra note 99
(discussing City of Akron).
109. 430 U.S. 519 (1977). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing
Rath).
110. In a sense, Hughey reduces express preemption to a game of competing defini-
tions to avoid preemption. See supra note 96 comparing substantively similar provi-
sions in Hughey and Knepper treated differently by the respective courts. The term
"primary purpose" is also sufficiently vague. A court may interpret this as fifty-one
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criticism, through implied preemption analysis.11 Moreover, the test
motivates states to avoid preemption in this context to increase worker
safety, a goal consonant with federal policy.112 Because preemption
analyses are generally case-by-case,"I 3 and dependent on regulation de-
terminations,114 the holding in Hughey has a limited impact." 5 By the
same token, prior OSH Act preemption cases had little bearing on
Hughey's outcome, even if they evinced an overall bias towards pre-
emption.1 1 6 In light of this background, and despite the Hazard Com-
munication Standard's wording which may have a broad interpretation
of preemptive effect,117 the Hughey court ruled correctly and left be-
hind a fair test, sufficiently flexible to settle complicated preemption
issues under the OSH Act.
Charles A. Horowitz*
percent of a state's purpose, something more than this, or something less, in the case
where numerous purposes exist, with one relatively greater than the rest.
111. But see supra note 99 (limiting analysis to express preemption where charging
party does not allege conflict with congressional purpose).
112. The New Jersey rules are broader than the Hazard Communication Standard,
requiring, for instance, the labeling of pipelines within the factory. See supra notes 13
and 14 (listing provisions of the state law and federal standard).
113. "The full scope of the preemptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains
to be fleshed out on a cases-by-case basis." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220. As the hazard
communication cases discussed in this comment show, each preemption analysis is
shaped by the language of the laws in controversy.
114. In Hughey I, the court rejected plaintiffs' comparison of preemption cases in-
volving the Employee Retirement Income Savings Act (ERISA) to OSH Act cases,
calling ERISA's preemption language "much more explicit than the language of the
OSH Act." 774 F.2d. at 593. The ERISA provisions in controversy state that they
"shall supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan," as compared to the more passive OSH Act language which
grants states jurisdiction over areas where there no OSHA standard exists. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988).
115. This saves Hughey from the criticism that its "window" for escaping preemp-
tion will lead to unfavorable results in other areas, such as where a state might wish to
engage in actions incidentally impeding the flow of interstate commerce.
116. Hughey I demonstrably overstated the case when it concluded that the OSH
Act's preemption language in section 18(a) "has been consistently interpreted by OSHA
and the courts to bar the exercise of state jurisdiction over issues addressed by an OSHA
standard." 600 F. Supp. at 618. A number of cases in varying contexts tell otherwise.
See supra notes 70-98 and accompanying texts (citing and discussing cases prior to
Hughey I in which state laws survived OSH Act attack).
117. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing the preemptive lan-
guage of the OSH Act and the Hazard Communication Standard).
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